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Banking systems of Western industrialized countries can be classified 
into two main groups. On the one hand, there are countries in which 
the regulation of financial institutions is based on a complex set of 
well defined rules. On the other, there are countries in which the 
regulation of financial institutions relies on the delegation of wide 
discretionary powers to agencies or other public authorities charged 
with the responsibility of guaranteeing the safety and the well-function­
ing of the financial system.
This basic distinction does not depend on the traditional opposition 
between common law - civil law countries. As a matter of fact, examples 
exist of common law countries - such as the U.S.A. - in which a clear- 
cut set of rules regulates the activities of banks and other financial 
institutions, alongside discretionary powers conferred on the various 
supervisory authorities (FED, Comptroller of the Currency, FDIC, etc.). 
And it is not unusual for banks and bankers’ associations to challenge 
in court the (often too restrictive) interpretation of these rules given 
by the supervisory authorities.
At the other end of the spectrum there are both common law countries 
such as Great Britain - and civil law countries - such as Italy and to 
some extent France - where supervisory authorities are vested with wide 
discretionary powers. In these countries banks have rarely, if ever, 
brought a legal suit against the central bank.
Within this classification, therefore, West Germany is a typical 
civil law country in which banking regulation (mainly at a statutory 
level) clearly defines the range of permitted activities, quantitative 
ceilings, ratios and other limits imposed on banks and other financial 




























































































The well-functioning of such an approach to banking regulation 
assumes, as a pre-condition, a political system in which both the Govern­
ment and Parliament are capable of promptly modifying and adapting the 
rules in force, whenever required by changes in general economic conditions 
or other emergencies. As a matter of fact, such legislative process is 
much more burdensome and timeconsuming than the exercise of a discretionary 
power by an administrative body. As we shall see, however, banking legis­
lation in West Germany has undergone the necessary adjustments without 
delay whenever it has been deemed necessary.
A well defined set of rules, as will be clarified below, is also 
critical for the smooth functioning of a banking system, such as that 
of Germany, that has adopted and never rejected the potentially (and 
historically) more dangerous model of the so-called "universal banks".^
This brings us to a second and more particular feature of the 
German banking system. Universal banks (Universalbanken) can be defined 
as banks covering a whole range of financial activités, i.e. providing 
both commercial and investment banking services.
We shall analyze in detail the list of permitted activities to see 
how such a system is not necessarily less safe than a system of special­
ized financial institutions.
From a historical perspective, the model of universal banking was 
dominant in Western industrialized countries for a long period of time, 
with the significant exceptions of Great Britain and, after the collapse 
of the Credit Mobilier in 1867, of France. It was only after the bank
1) For a discussion of the model of universal banking also from the 
historical point of view, see H. Biischgen, Das Universalbankensystem, 



























































































-  3 -
crisis of the thirties that many countries adopted legislation introducing 
the principle of strict separation of commercial and investment banking 
activities. One of the most "draconian" of these pieces of legislation 
is the well known Glass-Steagall Banking Act passed by the U.S. Congress 
in 1933.
Although German banks were deeply shaken by the bank crisis of 1931, 
the Reichsgesetz iiber das Kreditwesen of December 5, 1934 - the first
comprehensive statute regulating the banking system in Germany - did not
2)abandon the principle of universal banking.
On the contrary, German bankers, analysts and scholars unanimously
share the belief that the universal banking system is far more efficient
_ , 3)and stable than a specialized banking system. This belief seems to be
supported by the fact that the stream of financial innovation experienced
in recent years in most Western industrialized countries has left Germany
almost unaffected and, in any case, has not given rise to the feelings of
deep concern and apprehension - widespread in many other countries - for
the stability of the financial system. At the same time, the economic
performance of West Germany has been highly satisfactory in the past few
decades.
The links between financial innovation and the principle of universal 
banking will be explored in this paper in order to test the optimism of 
German experts mentioned above.
The task of analyzing the legal framework of the German banking 
system becomes more interesting if we also consider the fact that in
2) See K.E. Born, Die deutsche Bankkrise, 1931, München, 1967.
3) See for example the editorial "Konkurrenz der Système", Zeitschrift 



























































































-  4 -
the eighties many financial systems have experienced a rapid process of 
deregulation. Barriers between classes of banks and between banks and 
other types of financial institutions have been (or are in the process 
of being) torn down. The trend toward a "despecialization" of specialized 
financial systems raises the question as to whether old pieces of legisla­
tion, such as the Glass-Steagall Banking Act, are still abreast of the 
times. Can we perhaps foresee in the future a new generalized upsurge 
of the model of universal banking?
Along with deregulation, another significant institutional trend 
at an EEC level brings one’s attention to the universal banking system.
The introduction within the financial systems of EEC member states 
of the principle of "home country control", which is now under serious 
consideration, will give German banks operating with branches or sub­
sidiaries in other EEC countries a significant competitive advantage: 
they will be allowed to engage in both commercial and investment bank­
ing activities in countries in which domestic banks are confined either 
to commercial banking or investment banking activities.
These are the main themes underlying this paper, which will attempt 
to offer a clear and simple picture of the legal framework, the evolution 
in recent years and the current major issues of the German banking system.
2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Before we turn our attention to the legal structure of the German banking 
system, it might be useful to sketch the main features of the financial 
system in general, with the aim of showing how pervasive is the role 
played by the universal banks and how little room is left for the develop­




























































































-  5 -
German banks provide the main mechanism for the transmission of funds 
from savers to investors and even dominate the organized capital markets.
One simple way of proving this proposition is to consider the liability 
structure of personal and non-financial company sectors of the economy.
Almost two thirds of their total liabilities consist of borrowing from
4)banks. This figure becomes even more significant, if we consider the 
fact that in the United Kingdom the corresponding figure amounts to only 
one quarter. On the other hand, securities represent a source of business 
finance much less important in West Germany than it is in the United King­
dom (one tenth compared to more than one third).
At the same time, the role played by non-bank institutional investors - 
such as life insurance companies, pension funds, investment and unit trusts - 
as financial intermediaries between private savers and borrowers is rather 
limited in Germany.
There are historical as well as institutional reasons which account 
for these structural differences between the two countries. It is not the 
purpose of this paper to compare the historic evolution of the two financial 
systems. It seems enough here to recall how Germany is listed among those 
countries known as "late comers" in the process of industrialization. This 
process started and gained momentum only after Germany reached political 
unity.
Germany had therefore to catch up with those countries known as "first 
comers", such as the United Kingdom, where the process of accumulation of 
financial resources took place gradually and involved many different in­
stitutions .
4) See "Business finance in the United Kingdom and Germany", Bank of England 



























































































-  6 -
In the absence of other suppliers of financial resources, German 
banks took the lead in raising and channelling funds to industry and 
became directly involved in the process of creating a developed in­
dustrial structure. Right from the beginning, therefore, German banks - 
and especially the so-called GroBbanken - played a dominant role within 
the financial sytem.~^
But there are also some institutional factors which explain this 
peculiar feature of the German financial system.
First of all, in West Germany most of the states (Lander) have their 
own regional stock exchanges: today, there are still eight independent 
regional stock exchanges, of which Frankfurt and Düsseldorf are the most 
important. The resulting fragmentation of the capital market partly 
explains its limited role.^
Moreover, only public limited companies (Aktiengesellschaften) are 
legally entitled to raise liquidity funds in the share market. However, 
owners of smaller and medium-sized businesses tend to regard the public 
limited company as unattractive because of the rather strict regulations 
imposed on the organization of such companies. They are required to set 
up supervisory boards, to have the annual accounts certified by an inde­
pendent auditor, to publish their annual reports and, last but not least,
5) See H. Pohl - M. Pohl, Deutsche Bankengeschichte, Frankfurt am Main,
1982; M. Pohl, Einfiihrung in die deutsche Bankengeschichte, Frankfurt am 
Main, 1976; W. Hagemann, Das Verhaltnis der deutschen GroBbanken zur In­
dustrie, Berlin, 1931.
6) See "Stock exchange - Toward centralization", The Banker, May 1986, p.
96; W. Roller, "Neuorganisation des deutschen Borsenwesens", Die Bank, August 
1986, p. 397 f f - ; S. Kiimpel,"Borsenrechtliche Fragen bei Schaffung des 
geregelten Marktes", Festschrift fur K. Pleyer, Kôln, Berlin, Bonn, München, 



























































































-  7 -
to let their employees nominate, under the Labour Management Relations 
Act of 1952, one third of the members of the supervisory board.^
In 1983 there were only 2140 public limited companies. It should 
also be noted that only a small proportion (one fifth) of these enter­
prises were listed on a German stock exchange. The apparent reluctance 
of many public limited companies to go to the stock exchange is partly 
due to their dependence for official admission on the active support of 
banks. Banks, in order not to endanger their reputation, are very selective 
in assessing the quality of the applicant enterprise. Admittedly this is 
one area in which the lack of specialized financial institutions competing 
with banks (and the conservative attitude of the latter) seems apparent.
The regime of taxation of corporate equity capital and shareholders' 
wealth is also somewhat less favourable in West Germany than it is in
Q \
other countries, although some major tax burdens were removed in 1977. ;
Finally, the organization of the social insurance system and the legal 
arrangements of the employee's contributions have had the effect of penal-
9)izing the growth of non-bank financial institutions such as pension funds.
As a result of these and other legal factors - and it should be noted 
that we have dealt so far only with regulations which do not apply directly 
to the banking system - German banks have acquired and always held a dominant 
position within the financial system.
7) See "The share market in the Federal Republic of Germany and its develop­
ment potential", Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bank, April 1984, p. 36 ff.
8) Op.cit., p. 13.
9) See "Company pension schemes in the Federal Republic of Germany", Monthly 



























































































Their operations cover, along with short-term overdraft lines, 
discount and acceptance credits, a broad range of medium and long-term 
loans, instalment credits and even mortgages (generally provided by in­
dependent subsidiaries). In addition, they invest in securities markets 
on their own account and issue their own "bank bonds".
Let us briefly consider these two last activities.
The direct investment by banks in equity shares, although significant 
(9% by value of all ordinary and preference shares), is relatively limited. 
But in order to assess the influence which German banks have upon companies, 
it must be realized that very often they exercise the voting rights on shares 
deposited with them. The allegation that banks have an excessive hold on 
industry (an issue discussed under the headline "Macht der Banken") stems 
more from their exercise of voting rights (e.g. the appointment of their 
representatives to the supervisory boards of companies) than from their 
own direct investment. As we shall see later, the Gessler Commission, set 
up by the Minister of Finance in 1974 to inquire into the main problems of 
the banking system, concluded that in fact the power of banks is not as 
pervasive as it might appear at first sight.
As far as the bond issuing activity of banks is concerned, it should 
first be noted that in West Germany the bond market is comparatively more 
important than the share m a r k e t . I t  is therefore remarkable that the 
bond market is almost entirely monopolized by German banks: indeed three 
quarters of the outstanding domestic bonds are bank bonds. We are not far 
from the truth if we say that the bond market in Germany serves primarily 
as a means by which banks raise and invest long term funds.
10) See Bericht der Studienkommission "Grundsatzfragen der Kreditwirt- 
schaft", Schriftenreihe des Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Heft 18, 
1979, § 415 ff.
11) See "Business finance in the United Kingdom and Germany", Bank of 




























































































To complete the picture of the German financial system, we have to 
mention some other institutions located outside the banking system that 
in recent years have been slowly but increasingly moving into banking­
like business. This phenomenon is, however, more significant in countries 
such as the U.S.A., where legal barriers between different types of inter­
mediaries are more rigid and pose serious problems of competitive equality 
between banks and non-banks.
12)Among these institutions, we should first consider the "Post Bank".
This name describes the banking activity of the German Federal Post Office 
(Deutsche Bundes Post), which has two postal savings banks offices (Post- 
sparkassenamter) and 13 postal giro banks (Postscheckamter), with a total 
of more than 18000 branches, i.e. Post offices. The Post Bank offers money 
transfer, postal cheque and postal savings services and, to a limited extent, 
the possibility of an overdraft. A policy issue currently under discussion 
in West Germany is whether, and to what extent, the banking-like activity 
of the Post Bank should be increased.
Along with insurance companies, in recent years retail outfits (in­
cluding warehouses, airline, automobile and oil companies) have been 
finding financial services business increasingly attractive. Moreover,
credit card organizations, such as Amexco or Diners Club have been
13)coming more and more into direct competition with banks.
12) See F. Osselbühl, "Bestand und Erweiterung des Wirkungskreises der 
Deutschen Bundespost", Bd. 383 der Schriften zum offentlichen Recht,
Berlin, 1980; P. Lerche-C. Graf von Pestalozza, Die Deutsche Bundespost 
als Wettbewerber, Koln, 1985; A. Eiden-Miiller, Grundlagen des Post- und 
Postbankrechts, Frankfurt am Main, 1983; D. Hahn, Die Postbank - Ihre 
Stellung in der Bankwirtschaft, Wiesbaden, 1978.
13) See H.D. Spanier, "Wettbewerb urn den Privatkunden: Financial Services", 
Die Bank, November 1985, p. 548 ff.; U.H. Schneider, Die Entwicklung
des Bankenaufsichtsrechts, Standortbestimmung: Entwicklungslinien der 




























































































German banks have successfully tried to match the competition of 
these and other intermediaries by extending the range of their activities, 
for example by offering their customers combined special savings plans and 
insurance deals.
The ultimate result is that (as in other countries) the private 
customer has been more and more flattered by all kinds of institutions 
competing with each other.
3. THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
After having briefly described the main features of the German financial 
system, we can now focus on the legal framework of the banking system 
with the aim of disclosing the "arcane secrets" of the principle of 
universal banking.
Indeed, many non-German observers frequently seem puzzled when 
faced with the question of why this principle has worked so well in 
West Germany, while, at first sight, it seems a fairly dangerous and 
destabilizing principle.
We can anticipate that the answer lies in the finely-tuned regula­
tion of the different kinds of permitted activities, of the capital 
basis and liquidity requirements (limits and ratios on investments and 
on the extension of credits).
Giroverband anlaBlich seines hundertjahrigen Bestehens, Stuttgart, 1984, 
p. 104 ff.; R. Schwebler, "Die Anlagepolitik der Lebensversicherungen 
auf Markten im Strukturwandel", Die Bank, July 1985, p. 346 ff.;
W. Ziigel, "Wie bestehen die Banken die Herausforderungen der Zukunft?", 





























































































First we shall sketch the evolution of the legislation of the bank-
,  -  1 4 )ing system.
As already mentioned, the first comprehensive piece of legislation 
in Germany was the Banking Act of 1934 which was passed as a consequence 
of the breakdown of the banking system in the bank crisis of 1931.*^ 
Interestingly enough, the Commission of Enquiry set up by the government 
after the bank crisis did not come up with the conclusion that the prin­
ciple of universal banking in itself was directly responsible for the 
crisis. Therefore, while the Banking Act of 1934 introduced a system 
of governmental supervision of banks on a generalized scale (bank licence, 
regulation of operations, reporting obligations, rights of investigation 
of the supervisory authority, etc.), it did not replace the principle of 
universal banking with the principle of specialization of banking activity.
The Banking Act of 1961 (Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen of July 10, 1961), 
still in force today, preserved unaltered the basic philosophy and the 
general structure of the Banking Act of 1934.
Some substantial changes were brought about by the Second Act to Amend 
the Banking Act of March 24, 1976. On that occasion amendments were intro­
duced to close the loopholes in bank supervision which had appeared in 
connection with the failure of some small and medium-sized banks, and, in 
particular, with the collapse of the Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt.1^
14) See E. Ketzel, Das Kreditwesen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Koln, 
1982; 0. Hahn, "Struktur der Bankwirtschaft", Band I, Banktypologie und 
Universalbanken, Berlin, 1981; H. Wolf, 30 Jahre Nachkriegsentwicklung im 
deutschen Bankwesen, Mainz, 1980; I. Bahre - M. Schneider, KWG-Kommentar, 
München, 1985; H. Pohl - M. Pohl, Deutsche Bankengeschichte, Frankfurt am 
Main, 1982.
15) K.E. Born, Die deutsche Bankenkrise 1931, München, 1967.
16) See M. Peltzer - J. Brooks, Gesetz über das Kreditwesen, Deutsch- 
englische Textausgabe des Gesetzes über das Kreditwesen mit einer englischen 





























































































The urgent measures adopted by Parliament included, among others, 
the strengthening of restrictions on large-scale credits, the establish­
ment of the principle requiring banks to have at least two duly qualified 
managers (the so-called Vieraugenprinzip), an increase in the reporting 
obligations of banks, and enlarged rights of investigation and intervention 
by the supervisory authority.
At an administrative level, the supervisory authority, acting in the 
exercise of the rulemaking power conferred by Articles 10(1) and 11 of the 
Banking Act, introduced a new set of rules (Principle I a) imposing 
restrictions on foreign currency transactions as a reaction to the Herstatt 
collapse, which was caused largely by foreign exchange speculation.
In November 1974 the Minister of Finance set up the abovementioned 
Gessler Commission to investigate the main problems that had become apparent 
in the seventies (even before the Herstatt failure). It was also given the 
task of reconsidering the structure of the German banking industry and its 
role in the economy.
Although the final report published in 1979 came to the conclusion 
that the German banking system, based on the principle of universal banking, 
had worked well, it did suggest that a list of additional remedies to over­
come some perceived shortcomings in bank supervision should be introduced 
by making certain changes in the Banking Act.
Some of the proposals of the Gessler Commission have thus been recent­
ly embraced by the Third Act to Amend the Banking Act of December 6, 1984, 
which came into force on January 1, 1985.^  This piece of legislation has
17) See "Amendment of the Banking Act", Monthly Report of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, March 1985, p. 35 -ff.; J. Eicke, "Vom Umgang mit dem neuen 
KWG", Zeitschrift fur das gesamte Kreditwesen, 1985, n.15, p. 705 ff., 




























































































redefined the concept of capital (haftendes Eigenkapital) as used for 
supervisory purposes, tightened up the general regulations on the 
limitation of risk and improved the capacity of the supervisory authority 
to obtain information. At the same time, it implemented in Germany the 
Directive of the Council of the European Communities of July 13, 1983 on 
the supervision of banks on a consolidated basis. Incidentally, West 
Germany was the first country in Europe to implement this directive.
It is worth noting that, as on the previous occasion, this new 
piece of legislation was passed in connection with the failure of an im­
portant and prestigious bank, the Schrbder-Miinchmeyer-Hengst & Co. Bank 
in November 1983.^^
What needs to be stressed here is not the fact that bank failures 
still occur, notwithstanding a comprehensive system of bank supervision, 
but the fact that the German political system has shown once again the 
capacity of promptly changing the legislation in a highly sensitive field 
such as the banking system, where confidence of the public in the sound­
ness of the financial institutions can be rather volatile.
In considering the overall evolution of the banking legislation in 
West Germany, one might think that the trend has been somewhat opposed 
to that of most other foreign banking systems, which have recently been 
experiencing a process of deregulation. Nevertheless, it should be pointed 
out that since the German banking system is based on a model of universal 
banking, it has never faced the necessity of dismantling the rigid barriers 
between classes of banks that have been erected by the legislation in many 
other countries.
18) For more details see H. Geiger, "KWG-Reform und Uberlegungen zum SMH- 
Fall", in Sparkasse, 1984, ,n. 1, p. 7 ff. ; H.D. Dieppe, "KWG-Novellierung 
und finanzielle Stabilitat", Zeitschrift fur das gesamte Kreditwesen, 1984, 




























































































Moreover, in accordance with a basic free market stance, West Germany 
had already removed controls on bank lending and deposit rates and restrict­
ions on capital transactions with foreign countries in 1967 and 1961 res­
pectively.
On the other hand, most Western banking systems have perceived the 
need for closing loopholes and strengthening the supervision of banks.
In recent years, many countries have either introduced or are considering 
the possibility of introducing more restrictive measures.
We can now turn to consider the general structure of the German bank­
ing system. One way of outlining the various groups of banking institutions 
is to follow the classification applied by the Federal Bank (Bundesbank) for 
statistical purposes.
The banking industry in West Germany can be divided into two main
sectors: multipurpose or universal banks (Universalbanken) and specialist
20)banks (Spezialbanken).
The first sector includes various groups of banks: although they differ 
considerably in legal form (private or public law banks), administrative 
organization (cooperative), and size and main fields of business, they 
may provide, as a matter of principle, the full range of commercial and 
investment banking services as defined by the Banking Act of 1961.
19) See "Freedom of Germany's capital transactions with foreign countries", 
Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, July 1985, p. 13 ff. 20
20) See E. Ketzel, Das Kreditwesen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Koln, 
1982, p. 80 ff.; A banker research unit, Banking Structures and sources
of finance in the European Community - Germany, London, 1981, 4th Ed.;
0. Hahn, "Struktur der Bankwirtschaft", Band I, Banktypologie und Universal­
banken, Berlin, 1981, Band II, Spezialbanken und Internationale Banken, Berlin, 
1984; K. Scheidl, "Die Geschaftsbanken", in G. Obst - 0. Hintner, Geld- Bank- 




























































































This sector, which represents the core of the German banking, consists 
of three main groups of universal banks: private commercial banks (private 
Geschaftsbanken), commercial banks incorporated under public law (offentlich- 
rechtliche Kreditinstitute) and credit associations (Kreditgenossenschaften).
The first group consists of four categories: the three big banks (GroB- 
banken); the regional banks (Regionalbanken); the private banks organized as 
partnership or as sole proprietorship (Privatbanken); and branches of foreign 
banks.21)
The second group consists of savings banks (Sparkassen) and their central 
clearing institutions (Landesbanken, Girozentralen). Peculiar to all these 
institutions is the fact that their incorporation is a matter of State law: 
each State (Land) of the Federation (Bund) approves its own Savings Bank 
Act (Sparkassengesetz), which determines the structure and the organization 
of savings banks, provides a special State supervision and imposes full 
liability for their debits on the founding municipality or district. Restrict­
ions on some risky investments and on areas in which they may operate (the 
so-called Regionalprinzip) are also a matter of State law.
The third group consists of commercial credit associations (Volksbanken) 
and rural credit associations (Raffaisenbanken).
They are organized in the legal form of cooperatives: most of them are 
cooperatives in which their members have a limited liability to make additional 
contributions (beschrankte NachschuBpflicht).
We need not describe in detail all these groups of universal banks. We 
should, however, stress how, while all these groups of banks, as a matter of
21) See H.E. Buschgen, Die GroBbanken, Frankfurt, 1983; H.C. Schroeder- 
Hohenwarth, "Die privaten Banken - Rückschau und Ausblick", Zeitschrift fiir 




























































































law, may carry out all types of banking activities, in fact, for historic 
reasons, economic environment, location, and other factors, they have 
different priorities in the sources of funds, lending business and services
provided. In other words, the principle of universal banking, does not
22)preclude a de facto specialization.
It is also worthwhile emphasizing how the Banking Act does not provide 
an explicit classification of the different groups of universal banks. Art.
1 of the Banking Act gives a very general definition of what a bank is 
according to the meaning of the statute simply by listing - as we will 
see later in detail - the activities which are considered typical of banks.
The Banking Act takes into account the legal forms and organization of 
the different groups of banks only indirectly and with reference to specific 
subj ects.
For example, Art. 10 contains a detailed definition of the term "liable 
capital" (haftendes Eigenkapital) for each of the various legal forms of 
banks.
For the rest, the technique of the Banking Act is to regulate the bank­
ing activity as such.
The second main sector of the banking industry is formed by the specialist 
banks.
Among these, we should mention mortgage banks incorporated under private 
law (Hypothekenbanken) or under public law (offentlich-rechtliche Realkredit- 
institute). These banks are specialized according to two types of lending 2
22) G. Zweig, "Universalbankprinzip", Handworterbuch der Sparkassen Deutscher 
Sparkassenverlag, Stuttgart, 1981; H. Biischgen, Das Universalbankensystem, 




























































































business: long-term loans secured by mortgages and loans to municipalities
or other public institutions. The loans are financed by issuing either 
mortgage bonds (Hypothekenpfandbriefe) or municipal bonds (Kommunalobliga- 
tionen). Mortgage banks are subject to a special set of rules (Hypotheken- 
bankgesetz of February 5, 1963, Gesetz iiber Pfandbriefe und vervandte Schuld- 
versicherungen offentlichrechtlichen Kreditanstalten of May 8, 1962).
One important point is that, while the range of permitted activities 
of mortgage banks is very limited, the law does not prohibit the acquisition
of mortgage banks by universal banks. Indeed, among other universal banks,
23)each of the three GroBbanken holds a participation in a mortgage bank.
Building loan savings banks (Bausparkassen) represent another group of 
specialist banks. They extend loans to depositors after completion of a 
constractual savings plan secured by second mortgages exclusively used for 
the acquisition, renovation or improvement of private homes. They are 
governed by the Building Loan Savings Banks Act (Gesetz liber Bausparkassen 
of November 16, 1972).
Other specialist banks include Instalment Finance Banks (Teilzahlungs- 
banken, specialized in the consumer credit business; security-deposit banks 
(Kassenvereine), which provide giro-transferable collective custody and 
security giro-transfer; investments funds (Kapitalanlagegesellschaften); 
the AKA-Ausfuhrkreditbank GmbH, engaged in the financing of exports of 
industrial goods, the Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau, which extends loans 
to promote the German economy and provides long-term export credits; and 
the Industriekreditbank AG - Deutsche Industriebank, which provides medium 
and long-term loans for enterprises. 23





























































































Some of them are expressly exempted from the provisions of the Banking 
Act (KWG) (e.g. the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau: Art. 2 KWG). Other 
specialist banks, such as mortgage banks and building loan savings 
banks and investment funds, in addition to the special regulation, are 
also subject to some selected provisions of the Banking Act (for example 
in the field of supervision: Art. 3 Hypothekenbankgesetz and Art. 3 
Gesetz iiber Bausparkassen which explicitly refer to the relevant provisions 
of the Banking Act).
For the purpose of this paper, the brief outline of the different 
groups of banking institutions seems sufficient.
Before discussing the main rules defining the activities of the uni­
versal banks, it seems necessary to deal with the system of bank super-
, . 24)vision.
The supervision of banks under the Banking Act is carried out by the 
Federal Banking Supervisory Office (FBSO) (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das 
Kreditwesen), in close cooperation with the German Federal Bank (Deutsche 
Bundesbank) (Art. 7 KGW).
The Federal Bank's main function is that of a central bank: it has 
the duty "to regulate the circulation of money and the supply of credit 
to the economy with the aim of safeguarding the currency, and to provide 
for normal banking clearance of payment transactions with the Federal 24
24) See U.H. Schneider, Die Entwicklung des Bankenaufsichtsrechts, Stand- 
ortbestimmung: Entwicklungslinien der deutschen Kreditwirtschaft, heraus- 
gegeben vom Deutschen Sparkassen- und Giroverband anlaBlich seines hundert- 
jahrigen Bestehens, Stuttgart, 1984, p. 83 ff.; Das Bankwesen in Deutsch­
land. Eine Einfiihrung in das deutsche Bankenwesen; H. Schneider - H.J. 
Hellwig - J.K. Kingsman, Frankfurt am Main, 1978, p. 32 ff.; E. Ketzel,
Das Kreditwesen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Koln, 1982, p. 122 





























































































Republic of Germany and with foreign countries" (Art. 3 of the Federal 
Bank Act of July 26, 1957) (Gesetz uber die Deutsche Bundesbank).
The Federal Bank has several instruments which it may use in order 
to control the circulation of money and to maintain monetary stability.
Amont these, the instrument which most effectively influences the banks 
(their liquidity and their lending potential) is the minimum reserve 
policy. The rules on minimum reserves are contained in Art. 16 of the 
Federal Banking Act.
Besides this specific power to regulate the activity of banks, the 
Federal Bank collects and evaluates the various financial reports 
(monthly returns, statistics, reports of large loans) to be made by the 
banks. The Federal Bank is required to pass on to the FBSO the reports 
and the results of statistical surveys (Art. 18 of the Federal Banking 
Act). It is then the primary responsibility of the FBSO to take the 
appropriate steps in the light of such reports.
The FBSO was established as an independent federal authority, headed 
by a president who is appointed by the President of the Federal Republic 
acting on a proposal from the Federal Government which must consult the 
Federal Bank on the matter (Art. 5 KWG). The FBSO is subject to the 
instructions of the Federal Minister of Finance.
The main function of the FBSO is to supervise the operations of banks 
in order "to prevent abuses in the banking system which might endanger the 
security of the assets entrusted to banking institutions, adversely affect 
the proper conduct of banking business or substantially prejudice the 
economy generally" (Art. 6 KWG).
To carry out these duties, a wide range of administrative powers are 
entrusted to the FBSO. To take some examples: the FBSO issues the banking 




























































































(Art. 32 KWG); it may revoke the licence under specified circumstances 
(Art. 35 KWG); requests from a bank all information pertaining to the 
bank’s operations; inspects all books and records of the bank and carry 
out an audit; sends some of its supervisors to attend shareholders’ 
meetings (Art. 44 KWG); and dismisses untrustworthy or unqualified managers 
(Art. 36 KWG).
Arts 10 and 11 of the Banking Act give the FBSO a very important 
policy-making power to be exercised in agreement with the Federal Bank.
In accordance with these articles, the two supervisory authorities deter­
mine the principles governing equity capital and liquidity requirements.
These principles (Grundsatze I, II, III liber das Eigenkapital und die 
Liquiditat der Kreditinstitute) issued on January 20, 1969 and amended 
many times, must be published in the Federal Gazette. As we shall see 
later, they encompass some of the fundamental rules upon which the 
principle of universal banking is based.
Even if we cannot deal in detail with the administrative powers 
exercised by the FBSO, it is worthwhile noticing that the Banking Act 
is very specific and analytic in determining situations and circumstances 
in which the FBSO may or may not exercise its powers. In other words, 
very little room for discretion is left to the supervisory authority.
An example of this is the banking licence procedure. The FBSO may 
refuse the licence to the applicant if and only if one of the following 
four conditions are not met (Art. 33 KWG): the capital necessary for the
operation is not available; the bank has not appointed at least two managers 
(the so-called Vieraugenprinzip); the managers are not "reliable" (zuver- 
lassig); the managers are not "professionally qualified" (fachlich geeignet). 
In the absence of these negative criteria, the applicant has a right in law 
to the licence, which can be enforced in Court. To be sure, the evaluation 
of the reliability and professional qualifications of the managers might 




























































































fined to technical matters and does not involve a true policy issue. 
Interesting enough, some room for discretion was conferred by the Banking 
Act of 1934 (Art. 4b)) to the supervisory authority which was empowered 
to assess the "need" for a new bank with reference to the general econo­
mic conditions of the market (the so-called Bediirfingspriifung) in granting 
a licence. The Banking Act of 1961 has suppressed this subjective test.
Thus, while the powers exercised by the FBSO are very penetrating in 
character, they may be exercised only when circumscribed and legally de­
fined events take place.
It is in this legal "environment" that we can best appreciate the 
principle of universal banking.
The general philosophy underlying this principle is, on the one hand, 
to analytically define some basic concepts, such as "liable capital" 
(haftendes Eigenkapital), "credit", "long-term financial resources"; and, 
on the other hand, to impose some rigid ratios between the different com­
ponents of the balance sheet of the bank: capital/risk assets ratio; long­
term assets/long-term financial resources ratio; investment capital ratio; 
capital/foreign currency position ratio; etc.
In other words, each universal bank is free to pursue its own business 
policy within the wide list of permitted activities, so long as it complies 
with the legal provisions on limitation of risks.
We shall now deal with some of these provisions in more detail. It 
should be noticed at the outset how the Amendments of the Banking Act of 
1976 and of 1984 have redefined and made more restrictive many of these 25
25) See "The Amendment of the Banking Act", Monthly Report of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, March 1985, p. 35 ff- ; V. Szagunn - K. Wohlschieb, Gesetz 
iiber das Kreditwesen, Kohlhammer Kommentare, Mainz, 1986; J. Henke, "Die 
Novelle zura Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen", Zeitschrift fiir Wirtschafts- und 




























































































The first step is to point out once again that Article 1 of the 
Banking Act of 1961 defines banks as enterprises engaged in banking trans­
actions. Such transactions consist of any of the following activities: 
deposit business; discount business; securities business; investment fund 
business; guarantee business; transfer and clearing business. This first 
general definition of the Banking Act lays down the foundation of the 
principle of universal banking: each banking institution in principle 
is free to engage in an extraordinary wide range of activities (subject 
to the supervision of the FBSO).
Yet, a second key statement of the Banking Act warns that "credit 
institutions, with the view of fulfilling their obligations toward their 
creditors, and particularly in order to safeguard the assets entrusted 
to them, must have an adequate liable capital" (Art. 10 KWG). The general 
freedom to engage in all kinds of banking activities must not put at danger 
the money depositors commit to them. The need for protecting depositors 
and, more generally, the stability of the banking system (especially vis- 
a-vis the so-called "domino effect" of bank failures) provides a legal 
justification for the imposition of ratios and other limits on extension 
of credits and on investments.
Among these limits, one of the most important is the rule, stated in 
Principle I, that a credit institution’s lending and participation should 
not exceed 18 times its liable capital. The same Principle I also includes 
a set of regulations designed to define the term "credit". In the compu­
tation of such ratio, some of the loans (generally the less risky ones) 
are to be included only in part; other loans, such as loans to public 
entities, are not to be counted.
The Amendment of 1984 has introduced a significant new item in the 
definition of "loan" contained in Art. 19 of the Banking Act: leasing 
business. Therefore, the Amendment, on the one hand, has recognised 
that leasing in economic terms constitutes lending secured by the asset 




























































































the activities listed in Art. 1 of the Banking Act. As a result, it has 
not absorbed leasing companies into a wider notion of what a bank is
o  f \
under the meaning of the Act.
As far as the concept of liable capital is concerned, we have already 
mentioned how Art. 10 of the Banking Act provides a specific definition 
for each group of banks (private commercial banks, savings banks, coopera­
tives) . The Amendment of the Banking Act of 1984 has introduced signifi­
cant changes. A major issue in the debate within the Gessler Commission 
was what should be considered as "liable capital" for the purpose of bank 
supervision.
The specific issues were whether subordinated loans should be con­
sidered as liable capital and whether an addition of guarantors' contingent 
liability should be included in the liable capital in the interest of 
savings banks and credit cooperatives. The solution adopted by the recent 
piece of legislation is based on the view that only paid-up own funds 
which are at the bank's disposal over the long-term and share in current 
losses should fall within the definition of liable capital.
The implementation of these new more rigid definitions is going to be 
gradual. For example, the addition of members' contingent liability to 
the credit cooperatives' capital and reserves to an amount of up to 50% 
of the amounts paid up on members' shares and the reserves will be reduced 
successively over a period of ten years to not more than 25%.
26) See W. Schick, "KWG und das Leasing", Zeitschrift fiir das gesamte Kre- 
ditwesen, 1985, Heft 2, p. 56 ff. ; C. Schiiking, "Leasinggeschafte der 
Banken nach der KWG-Novelle", Zeitschrift fiir das gesamte Kreditwesen, 1984, 
Heft 21, p. 978 ff. 27
27) See "Bericht der Studienkommission 'Grundsatzfragen der Kreditwirtschaft " 




























































































We need not consider these and other technicalities any further. The 
trend is now clear: the concept of liable capital should not be diluted 
by the introduction of capital surrogates.
Another limit intended to reduce the risk of banking activity has 
to do with the extent of individual large loans (GroBkredite). Art. 13 
of the Banking Act of 1961 originally provided that no single large loan 
should exceed 100% of the liable capital. This limit has been lowered 
to 75% by the Amendment of 1976 and to 50% by the Amendment of 1984.
Every large loan must be reported to the Federal Bank, which transmits 
the reports to the FBSO. A reporting obligation also exists for loans 
of one million deutschmarks or more (Art. 14).
As a result of this information exchange system, each bank can be 
advised by the Federal Bank of the aggregate obligations of major borrowers. 
The Amendment of 1984 has improved the system by including in it, among 
others, mortgage loans and loans granted by foreign subsidiaries of German 
banks.
Another important provision of the Banking Act is Art. 13, which 
stipulates that a bank's permanent investment in real estate, ships and 
participations may not exceed the liable capital. The reason for this 
limit is easily understood. These investments are highly illiquid and, 
therefore, only permanent funds should be used.
The Amendment of 1984 has modified Art. 13 in several respects: it 
has dropped the concept of "permanent" investment and it has replaced 
the concept of "participation" with the more widely embracing concept 
of "shares in capital". Again, the Amendment has moved in the direction 
of tightening up provisions to limit risk.
Furthermore, under Principle II, a bank's assets in the form of long­




























































































more), unlisted securities, participations, real estate, furniture and 
equipment, must not exceed the sum of long-term financial resources.
Within the definition of long-term financial resources, Principle II 
includes, inter alia, capital and reserves, liabilities with agreed 
maturity or period of notice of four years and over, 60% of savings 
deposits, 10% of the short-term liabilities. The underlying principle 
is that long-term assets must be matched by long-term liabilities.
We think that at this point the secrets of the principle of uni­
versal banking have been disclosed.
Although the Banking Act does not directly confine banking business 
to a restricted mandatory list of permitted activities, it employs the 
technique of determining rigid ratios between components of the asset 
and liability side of the balance sheet. The effect of this technique 
is to indirectly limit banks’ ability to engage in activities considered 
too risky and, in particular, to prevent banks from investing demand 
deposits in long-term assets. Even if things are not so neat in reality, 
the conclusion could be drawn that under the same "roof" of a universal 
bank one can discern two banks living together with little osmosis: a 
commercial bank and an investment bank.
To complete the picture of the functioning of universal banks three 
more points should be made.
Firstly, banks are also subject to antitrust laws (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen of July 27, 1957): the Federal Cartel Office
(Bundes Cartel Amt) may, under certain conditions, prohibit banks' acquisi­
tion of or participation in companies.
Secondly, although a compulsory statutory scheme of deposit insurance 




























































































(Bundesverband deutscher Banken) set up a Deposit Protestion Fund (Einlagen-
oo\
versicherungsfond) in 1976.
While membership of the fund is voluntary, in order to qualify for 
membership a bank must meet some conditions.
The purpose of the Deposit Protection Fund, according to its by-laws 
(Art. 2 (1)), is to provide assistance in the interest of depositors, in 
the event that a bank gets into financial difficulties (or such difficulties 
appear imminent) and to avoid damage to public confidence in the banking 
system.
Thirdly, the process of internationalization of German banks has
helped to break down the insulation of the German banking system from 
29)other banking systems. What needs to be stressed here are the steps 
taken by the Amendment of the Banking Act of 1984 in order to tighten up 
the supervision of foreign subsidiaries.
Prior to the Amendment of 1984, German banks had an incentive to 
open subsidiaries in countries in which capital requirements and other 
limits on the volume of lending were very low. This provided a way of 
avoiding the ratios imposed by the German Banking Act.
The Amendment of 1984 closed the loopholes by introducing a system 
of supervision of banking groups on a consolidated basis and thereby im-
28) See I. Dziallas - Laur, Die Einlagensicherung der privaten Kredit- 
institute, Dissertation, Universitat Tubingen, 1983; H. Kronester, 
Einlagesicherung bei deutschen Kreditinstitute, Dissertation, Ludwig- 
Maximilien Universitat München, 1983. 29
29) See "The offices of German banks abroad", in Monthly Report of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, May 1985, p. 25 ff. The process of international­
ization of the German banking system has also been favoured by the German 




























































































plemented in German law the directive of the Council of European Communities 
of July 13, 1983. It falls outside the purpose of this paper to analyze 
the technicalities of consolidation (e.g. the pro rata consolidation) and 
the other requirements introduced by the Amendment.
It is enough to stress how the new piece of legislation has success­
fully prevented the avoidance of some of the fundamental provisions govern­
ing the universal banks. As we have seen, the model of universal banking 
is not a model based on the deregulation of banks’ activities. On the 
contrary, it is based on a complex and sophisticated set of rules.
A. THE GERMAN BANKING SYSTEM IN THE WAVE OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
In recent years, international financial markets have undergone numerous 
structural changes. It is enough to cite the process of "securitization" 
of lending and the use of innovative financial instruments.
The pace and the extent of these processes have been especially 
important in some countries such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom. In West Germany, although banks have also made increasing use 
of the new types of financing techniques, in comparison with the scale of 
such activities by their foreign competitors, a more prudent and conserva­
tive approach has prevailed.
The purpose of this section is to inquire why the German banking system 
has been less affected than others by the wage of financial innovation and 
to analyze the main changes that have occurred in the past two to three 
years.
The first step is to recall the major driving forces behind the in­




























































































the last decade and to see how they have affected the German banking
„ 30)system.
It is generally agreed, that an important factor triggering financial 
innovation has been the large and unpredictable shifts in real and nominal 
interest rates caused primarily by high and variable rates of inflation. 
Banks have tried to develop techniques to minimize interest and exchange 
rate risks.
In countries in which interest rate ceilings and other restrictive 
regulations were in force, this economic environment triggered a process 
of disintermediation of the banking system in favour of other financial 
institutions (such as money market mutual funds in the U.S.A.) competing 
with banks. One of the answers to the problems caused by such disinterme­
diation was deregulation, which itself favoured the introduction of many 
new financial products and services.
Technological changes, particularly in computer technology, have made 
new types of financial transactions possible, and have made nearly all 
financial transactions faster and cheaper.
The extensive need for finance of the public sector in a number of 
countries has been another powerful force behind the creation of new 
investment assets to finance the budget deficit.
A higher degree of competition in financial markets has been another 
important factor. In countries in which competition among financial inter- 30
30) See L. Gleske, "Finanzinnovationen aus Sicht der Notenbanken und 
der Bankenaufsichtsbehorden", Die Bank, 1986, n. 6, p. 280 ff.; OECD, 
Financial Market Trends, June 1986, p. 12 ff.; "Innovation in Interna­





























































































mediaries has increased in recent years, the consumers' choice of financial 
products has widened much more than in countries characterized by an oligo­
polistic structure of the banking system.
A more general economic factor has been the reversal in the international 
balance of payments pattern due to the disappearance of surpluses of the OPEC 
countries.
We need not deal in detail with each of these factors triggering innova­
tion and the interaction between them. But if we try to consider in parti­
cular the German case, we can very clearly understand why the German financial 
system has undergone comparatively less significant changes.
First of all, West Germany enjoyed in the second world war period, and 
even in the past ten to fifteen years, a high degree of financial and monetary 
stability. The rate of inflation in West Germany has been significantly lower 
than that in most OECD countries. Moreover, market interest rates have been 
more or less in harmony with the general price level, and, therefore, savers
31)have not suffered great losses due to inflation.
The public deficit sector has always been under control and has never 
reached troublesome levels.
To compare the process of deregulation experienced in many countries 
in recent years with the situation in West Germany, it is enough to recall 
that control of lending and deposit rates and other restrictive measures
had been removed already in the sixties. In addition, the German universal-
32)type banking system provides a high degree of flexibility. As already 312*
31) See H.J. Dudler, "Financial Innovation in Germany", Changing Money, 
(ed.) M. de Cecco, Blackwell, Oxford, forthcoming 1987; K.O. Pohl, 
"Finanzinnovationen - Handikap filr die Geldpolitik?", Borsen-Zeitung, 
Frankfurt am Main, 12 October, 1985.
32) See "Innovation in International banking", Monthly Report of the




























































































mentioned, since German banks provide a full range of financial services, 
most non-bank financial institutions have been left with a minor role to 
play within the financial system. Moreover, non-bank financial institu­
tions, according to the Banking Act, would have been subject to the same 
reserve requirements and other regulations as banks, if they had decided 
to engage in activities defined as banking activités by Art. 1 of the 
Banking Act.
The principle of universal banking, therefore, nullifies, as a factor 
triggering financial innovation, the convenience and need for finding 
ways to avoid too restrictive regulations and legal barriers between dif­
ferent types of intermediaries.
One negative side effect of the principle of universal banking has 
been, until very recently, a lack of strong outside competitive pressure. 
This has allowed banks to pay below-market interest rates to small de­
positors, unable to have access to more competitive and profitable
33)markets (e.g. Euromarkets).
Another reason explaining the limited diffusion of financial inno­
vation in West Germany concerns the psychological attitude of the savers. 
Germans tend to be people who are not very enthusiastic about novelties
involving money. History has taught them, especially in the aftermath
34)of World War I, to be prudent and to appreciate financial stability.
As a response to innovation in international banking and to the 
increasing integration of international financial markets, the policy 
of the German Federal Bank until 1985 was to deliberately try to restrain 
the international use of the D-Mark by blocking the introduction of new 
DM-denominated financial instruments (zero-coupon bonds, currency swaps,
33) See J.D. Germany - J.E. Morton, "Financial Innovation and Deregulation 
in Foreign Industrial Countries", Federal Reserve Bulletin, October 1985. 34*





























































































floating rate notes, etc.)» The aim of the Federal Bank was to attempt
to limit West Germany's exposure to international interest rate and
35)exchange rate shocks.
While all these factors have had the effect of retarding financial 
innovation, technology has played a significant role in West Germany in 
transforming and streamlining banking procedures and in encouraging banks 
to provide more sophisticated services to the public (e.g., cashless wage 
and salary payment) cheaply.
To summarize, factors retarding financial innovation have had more 
weight in West Germany than factors stimulating it, and this has been 
particularly true with regard to international banking transactions.
In general, German observers have praised this more prudent stance 
of supervisory authorities and banks. Some observers do not consider 
those financial instruments created with the purpose of avoiding tax 
regulations being examples of true innovation. 1 Moreover, some of 
the new financial instruments have been considered too complicated,
confusing and dangerous, especially when the effect is to destroy the
37)distinction between capital and debt. Some other commentators have 
tried to discriminate between enduring and ephimeral innovations. Among
OO N
the former, the introduction of new technologies is the most significant. }
35) H.J. Dudler, "Financial innovation in Germany", Changing Money, (ed.) 
M. de Cecco, Blackwell, Oxford, forthcoming 1987. 3678
36) See "Innovationen", Zeitschrift fiir das gesamte Kreditwesen, June 1, 
1985, Heft 11, p. 487.
37) Op. cit., p. 488.
38) See L. Gleske, "Finanzinnovationen aus Sicht der Notenbanken und der 




























































































In the last two to three years the cautious attitude of the Federal 
Bank towards innovation in international banking has changed somewhat. 
Measures to enhance the international role of the deutschmark have been 
favoured.
The new policy of giving a green light to some financial innovation 
was a response to the fear that West Germany - and notably Frankfurt - 
would fall further behind London, New York and Tokyo as a world financial 
centre. A warning in this respect was the decision in 1984 of the Deutsche 
Bank, the biggest commercial bank in West Germany, to move its headquarters 
for its non-deutschmark Eurobond underwriting business from Frankfurt to 
London.39)
In other words, West Germany cannot afford to shut itself off from the 
trends under way in key competitor countries. The deutschmark must remain 
competitive against the international investment currencies; otherwise,
adverse effects on the exchange rate of the German currency may be predicted
40)in the long term.
As a first sign of the shift in attitude, we should consider the
abolition of the coupon-tax in 1984, i.e. the withholding tax on interest
41)income from non-residents domestic bonds.
The tax had been introduced in 1964. At that time fixed exchange rates 
and large capital imports were swelling the foreign exchange surpluses.
The tax was introduced as a means to ward off capital imports. However,
39) See J. Davies, "Frankfurt fights back from strength", The Banker,
May 1986, p. 87.
40) See "Freedom of Germany’s capital transactions with foreign countries", 
Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, July 1985, p. 37, ff.
41) "Freedom of Germany’s capital transactions with foreign countries", 




























































































the effect of the coupon-tax was discriminatory for non-resident investors, 
since it reduced their interest income.
The two major steps which go in the direction of the so-called 
"further liberalization" (Restliberalisierung) were, first, the decision 
of the Federal Bank to authorize banks from 1st May 1985 to use deutschmark 
innovative financial instruments such as zero-coupon bonds, double currency 
bonds, floating rate notes, etc.; second, the decision to allow German 
subsidiaries of foreign banks to act as lead managers of an issuing 
syndicate for foreign deutschmark bonds.
This latter measure has been widely praised as an important move
42)towards liberalization. Before 1st May 1935, only German banks were 
allowed to take management leadership in these issues. This was part of 
a gentlemen's agreement dating back to 1968 between the Federal Bank and 
German banks: at that time, a sub-committee of the Central Capital Market 
Committee (six German banks were members of this sub-committee) was set 
up with the aim of ensuring that there would be no bunching of foreign 
deutschmark issues that would strain the domestic capital market. The 
Federal Bank, which had a senior representative sitting in on the 
sub-committee, was kept informed of the volume and conditions of these 
issues, and could exercise influence in drawing-up the issuing calendar. 
There were, however, drawbacks to these arrangements. German banks which 
were not members of the sub-committee had to submit their list of prospec­
tive new issues via the "Club of Six". Subsidiaries of foreign banks 
had not been allowed to take on the lucrative business of lead-managing 
foreign deutschmark issues. Again, an anti-competitive effect was 
apparent.
42) Op. cit., p. 14. See also "Begebung vom DM-Auslandsanleihen", 
Pressenotiz der Deutschen Bundesbank, April 12, 1985; "Financial deregulat­




























































































The decision to open the issue market to German subsidiaries of foreign 
banks (and the authorization of new types of bonds) has already had the 
effect of significantly expanding the volume of issues without any of the 
feared negative effects on the German balance of payments or on the domestic 
capital market.
The authorization of new financial instruments already in use in 
international markets also seems very important, although further steps 
are needed to complete the liberalization. For example, floating-rate 
notes are subject to a stock exchange turnover tax (Borsenumsatzsteuer).
The trading in notes is therefore still hardly profitable in West Germany. 
The Federal Bank has already asked the Finance Minister to abolish the 
tax on floating-rate notes and on other securities. The Federal Government
in Bonn has agreed in principle, but has deferred the decision until after
44)the next election, due early in 1987.
Moreover, the Federal Bank has not yet permitted the use of
certificates of deposits, although it seems ready to allow it in the near
45)future. German banks with their huge branch networks do not show much
interest in this new instrument, but on the other hand, CD's might be very 
useful for the German subsidiaries of foreign banks. The introduction of 
CD's could also be an important step towards the creation of a secondary 
market for investors and multinationals.
43) See "Recent trends in securities transactions with foreign countries", 
Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, November 1985, p. 35.
44) See "Frankfurt fights back from strength", The Banker, May 1986, p. 88.
45) See G. Dierlf-J. Lechner, "Das Depositenzertifiket - Innovatives 
Finanzierungsinstrument", Zeitschrift fiir das gesamte Kreditwesen, n. 16, 1985, 
p. 760, ff., n. 17 1985, p. 806, ff.; "DM-CDs?", Wirtschaftsdienst der 
Berliner Handels- und Frankfurter Bank, January 19, 1985; "Germans see no 




























































































The introduction of new financial instruments in West Germany has 
induced the FBSO - as well as many supervisory authorities in other 
countries - to focus on the new risks associated especially with off- 
balance-sheet business. The main conclusion seems to be that off-balance- 
sheet risk should be regarded as an integral part of banks' overall risk 
profile. Therefore, the FBSO has decided to include, as from 1st June 
1986, underwriting commitments as warranties for the purpose of the ratio 
established in Principle I. The back-up facilities are included at half 
of their value in the calculation of the risk/asset ratio. The weighting 
is reduced to 20% when the facility has been arranged by a German bank.
The underwriting commitments are also counted within the large exposure
46)limits with a weight of 50%.
We have at this point analyzed the most significant changes that the 
German banking system has undergone in the recent past. If we consider 
them in the light of the new regulation introduced by the Amendment of 
the Banking Act of 1984, we can draw the conclusion that there are no 
signs that the model of universal banking is less abreast of the times 
today than it was in the past. On the contrary, the technically sophisti­
cated system of ratios, limits and ceilings has been revised and tightened- 
up, to include new financial instruments. And this is a sign more of the 
vitality than of the decline of the model.
While the German banking system has moved steadily along its own 
path already traced by the Banking Act of 1934, in many banking systems 
of Western industrialized countries the model of specialization has shown 
its limits. In recent years, legislators and supervisory authorities 
alike have been considering whether to loosen some of the rigidities 
introduced by the banking legislation of the thirties.
46) "Grundsatz I kvinftig auch fiir NIFS und RUFS", Borsen-Zeitung, February 
19, 1986; K.O. Pohl, "New instruments and risk management", American Banker, 
New York, June 5, 1986; "Innovation in international banking", Monthly Report 




























































































Even in the United Kingdom, where the model of specialization was 
first developed, and is rooted more in tradition than in law, the trend 
in the last 15 to 20 years has been towards an extension of the range of 
activities and services provided by banks. Official acknowledgement of 
this trend can be found in the Evidence by the Committee of London Clearing 
Banks to the Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions 
- the so-called Wilson Committee set up by the British Government in the 
late seventies. The evidence characterizes the evolution of the Clearing 
Banks in the past twenty years as a move towards the model of universal 
banking.
To summarize the results of this paper, the German banking system has 
historically represented and still represents a viable model which success­
fully reconciles the claim for flexibility and freedom to pursue an 
autonomous business policy on the part of the banks and the need for 
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